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Abstract
Privacy-aware intersection set computation (PISC) can be modeled as secure multi-party
computation. The basic idea is to compute the intersection of input sets without leaking pri-
vacy. Furthermore, PISC should be sufficiently flexible to recommend approximate intersec-
tion items. In this paper, we reveal two previously unpublished attacks against PISC, which
can be used to reveal and link one input set to another input set, resulting in privacy leak-
age. We coin these as Set Linkage Attack and Set Reveal Attack. We then present a light-
weight and flexible PISC scheme (LiPISC) and prove its security (including against Set
Linkage Attack and Set Reveal Attack).
1 Introduction
Online social networks (including enterprise social networks such as Yammer) and e-com-
merce websites are increasingly popular with both individual and organizational users. In these
applications, recommendations are a frequently used mechanism for users and service provid-
ers to suggest potential friends or interested commodities to other users. For example, in online
social networks such as Tencent QQ or Facebook, service providers recommend potential
friends to another user, by relying on the intersection set of the user’s friends’ friends. More
specifically in this context, B and C are A’s friends; thus, the intersection set of B’s friends and
C’s friends may be A’s potential friends. The service provider needs to conduct regular intersec-
tion set computation (ISC) to find the set D that excludes A’s friends. Users in set D are then
recommended to A as potential friends. Similarly, services or other contacts (e.g., prospective
partners for dating apps) are recommended using this (recommendation computation)
approach.
Recommendation computation can be generalized as the calculation of an intersection func-
tion, where the input is two or more sets and the output is the intersection set of the input sets.
We remark that the entity (e.g., online social network service providers) for computing
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intersection function may not always be trustworthy. Hence, the privacy of users may be leaked
(or compromised) during the computations. Therefore, privacy-aware computation of inter-
section set has attracted the attention of security and privacy researchers (see [1–7]), and is key
to the widespread adoption of online social networks and e-commence websites.
Most existing studies address specific privacy protection problems in the context of a partic-
ular application. Relatively few research formalize the privacy-aware computation of intersec-
tion set problem as an abstract problem (i.e., privacy-aware intersection set computation
(PISC)) or focus on designing schemes that are lightweight and flexible. This is the gap that we
seek to address in this paper. We also reveal two previously published security attacks against
PISC, namely: set reveal attack and set linkage attack.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight and flexible PISC (hereafter referred to as LiPISC)
scheme, which satisfies the following properties:
1. A basic requirement for privacy protection is for intersection computation to be conducted
over input sets with concealed members instead of plain members. This is more difficult
than traditional ISC.
2. An enhanced requirement for privacy protection is unlinkable. In other words, computation
entities cannot infer the existence of the same items using the received input sets after two
computation operations.
3. A basic requirement for flexibility is the capability to compute rough set. That is, PISC can
return approximate intersection set even though matched common members do not exist in
input sets.
4. Lightweight and scalable for large scale applications.
5. Security against set reveal attack, set linkage attack, and other common attacks.
We then prove the security of LiPISC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. In Sec-
tion 3, we present the basic assumption and models used in the paper. Section 4 details our pro-
posed LiPISC scheme and the security proof. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 RelatedWork
Ensuring the privacy of recommendations in social networks is a current research focus (see
[8–15]). Wicker and Schrader [8] surveyed the philosophical, legal, moral, and epistemological
literature on privacy in information networks, and introduced privacy-aware design principles.
In the same year, Pentafronimos, Karantjias and Polemi [9] identified privacy requirements in
collaborative workspaces, and suggested a number of guidelines for privacy-aware identity and
access management systems. Attempting to fulfill the privacy requirements in online social net-
works, Akcora, Carminati and Ferrari [10] proposed a privacy risk measure to provide users a
way of estimating risk (via the use of a Facebook prototype application). In 2013, Shoaran,
Thomo and Weber-Jahnke [11] studied privacy issue in big data. They used graphs to model
big data and proposed privacy-aware release of graph summarization using zero-knowledge
privacy. Similarly, Vidyalakshmi et al [12] proposed a privacy aware information dispersal
method in social networks, where they employed a supervised learning model to assist user in
spotting unintended audience for a post. A year later in 2014, Li [13] posited that users should
be able to indicate different comfort levels to share their friendships in social networks, and
this can be done by limiting the number of their friends returned in response to queries
through the friend search engine. They also proposed a new attack model that may infer more
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friendship information based on the friendships detected in the query results, as well as defin-
ing a model to safely display friends of individual users in response to queries. However, these
studies only focused on specific applications, rather than seeking to solve the underlying chal-
lenge using a generalized approach.
Privacy protection of recommendations in e-commerce systems has also been the subject of
extensive research. For example, Bunea et al [16] presented a privacy-aware collaborative filter-
ing recommender framework, where they used a probabilistic matrix factorization technique to
mitigate the sparsity and a dynamic privacy inference model to ensure privacy. In the dynami-
cally personalized recommendation algorithm of Tang and Zhou [17], information in ratings
and profile contents were used, without a strong focus on privacy protection. He, Ren and
Zhang [18] presented an approach to increase the conversion rate from browsing to buying.
Their method uses a behavior-based inference of a customer’s propensity to purchase from a
product category. Celdran et al [19] proposed a middle-ware to provide users with custom con-
text-aware recommendations. However, these studies neither focused on privacy protection
nor presented a more general method that can be deployed in a wide range of applications. We
also observe that there is no suggestion that PISC can be modeled as secure multi-party
computation.
PISC problem has been addressed using different approaches in the literature (see [1, 3–7]).
For example, Shao, Yang and Yu [1] used searchable encryption to fulfill private set intersec-
tion, in which public key encryption with multiple keywords search is used as the basic tool.
Zhao and Luo proposed a two-party private set intersection protocol based on negative data-
base [3]. The negative database is a new technique for preserving privacy, and it stores informa-
tion in the complementary set of a traditional database. The security foundation of this
technique is that reversing the negative database to recover the corresponding database is NP-
hard. In the study of how to extract common sensitive information from encrypted sets, Liu
et al [4] argued that existing methods are not suitable for cloud deployment. Hence, they
designed the Encrypted Set Intersection Protocol (ESIP) that allows server and users to per-
form collaborative operations to obtain the correct set intersection with privacy-preserving. In
the attempt to solve privacy-preserving intersection of regular languages instead of finite sets,
Guanciale, Gurov and Laud [5] proposed an approach based on minimal deterministic finite
automata. Wang, Zhu and Luo [6] proposed a scheme which allows any entity to publicly verify
the correctness of set intersection query, without requiring any secret key. More recently in
2015, Thapa et al [7] used asymmetric social proximity to design different private matching
protocols, designed to provide different privacy levels. We observe that the literature rarely
requires a PISC solution to be both lightweight and flexible. In the big data era, lightweight and
flexible are two critical properties for privacy-aware PISC [20, 21].
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Network Model
There are three entities in the intersection set computation, namely: an entity A, an entity B,
and a computation server C. Upon receiving the sets from A and B, C will compute and return
the intersection sets to A and B. For privacy protection, A and B conduct their respective com-
putations to conceal the original set prior to sending to C. C conducts the computation of PISC
over the concealed sets and returns information on the intersection of original sets.
We denote the set from A to C, the set from B to C, the the intersection set from C to A and
B, as SetA, SetB, and SetC, respectively. Thus, the basic logic flow in network model can be sim-
plified as follows:
Msg1) A! C : SetA, where x! y : z denotes a message z being sent from entity x to entity y.
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Msg2) B! C : SetB;
Msg3) C! A : SetC, C! B : SetC.
It is worth noting that SetA and SetB are concealed sets of the original sets, and SetC can be
redirected to the intersection of the original sets only at A and at B upon receipt.
3.2 Attack Model
We assume that the communication channels between entities and the server are protected by
standard security mechanisms (e.g., encryption and integrity protection) at link layers (e.g.,
IEEE802.11i and CDMA); thus, attackers who can sniff packets are beyond the scope of this
paper. In this paper, we focus on adversaries for privacy leakage at server side. In this context,
we point out the following potential attacks, and we denote the adversary as Adv.
Definition Set Reveal Attack (Advsra). The adversary reveals the privacy of entity A and
entity B from observing SetA and SetB. Roughly speaking, H(x) =H(x|SetA, SetB), whereH is the
entropy function and x is any information about A or B.
In other words, entity A and entity B present SetA and SetB to server C for discovering of the
intersection members. As the server C is not entirely trustworthy, the presenting sets should
not reveal the privacy of A or B. Thus, SetA and SetB must be transformed from the original sets
to the concealed sets for further intersection computation. That is, SetA and SetB that are pre-
sented to the server C must not leak the privacy of entity A and entity B, respectively. In the tra-
dition reductionist approach [22–24], the adversary we consider in this paper has an upper
bound in computational capabilities (i.e., a probabilistic polynomial-time turing machine—
PPTM).
Advsra captures the basic security notion, and the security can be achieved by some transfor-
mations guaranteeing computational secrecy. However, we observe that if sets presented to
untrustworthy servers are “linkable”, it may also compromise the privacy of entity A (or B).
This is because the adversary at the untrustworthy server can discover that entity A (or B) has
conducted the same behavior more frequently than others, the interests or preference at entity
A (or B) can then be inferred by the adversary (e.g., purchasing certain merchandise such as
milk powder more frequently than others). We coin such an attack against the PISC as a Set
Linkage Attack.
Definition Set Linkage Attack (Advsla). The adversary can successfully guess that at least
one item in SetA (or SetB) in one round is the same as another entity in a previous round.
Roughly speaking, PrfFind x; x 2 SetA
V
x 2 Set0Aj Observing SetA; Set0Ag > 1=2, where SetA
and Set0A are in two distinct rounds.
For example, after the adversary observes SetA in one round and Set0A in another round, the
adversary can link one member in SetA to another member in Set0A. That is, the adversary can
successfully guess there exists a same member in both SetA and Set0A, which can compromise
the privacy of that particular entity in some situations.
A more relaxed notion is to assume server C is semi-trustworthy (also known as honest-
but-curious adversary). That is, the computation on server C for intersection set computation
(mathematically) is trustworthy (i.e., correctly computed), but the adversary on server C may
seek to infer the privacy of entity A and entity B by observing SetA and SetB. Here, the computa-
tion functionality for intersection set has to be trustworthy as a prerequisite condition; other-
wise, we will not be able to achieve privacy-aware intersection set computation.
Thus, the privacy requirements are stated as follows:
Definition PriAdvsra ;AdvslaPISC . In the presence of Advsra and Advsla at a semi-trustworthy server C
with a computational bound, the intersection set of SetA and SetB uploaded by entity A and
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entity B can be correctly computed without compromising the privacy of entity A and entity B.
(Note that, the intersection set is for the original sets, rather than the concealed sets.)
3.3 Design Goals
The design of PISC should also consider flexibility, as SetA and SetB may not have the exact
intersection set. In other words, we can also compute the rough intersection set even though
SetA and SetB are not exactly or approximately equal. The flexibility will be particularly helpful
in social network and e-commerce applications, as approximate intersection set is adequate for
the required functionalities (e.g., identifying similar goods that may be of interest to an e-com-
merce user). Flexibility is also necessary when exact intersection set for the uploaded sets does
not exist.
To achieve flexible PISC in a lightweight manner is also important, particularly due to the
scale of data involved and the real-time nature of such computations. The lightweight compu-
tation in one time computation of PISC will significantly influence the scalability of the pro-
posed method.
Therefore, the design goals are lightweight and flexible PISC.
4 Proposed Scheme - LiPISC
Table 1 outlines the notation used in the proposed Lightweight and Flexible PISC (LiPISC)
scheme.
4.1 Abstract Model
LiPISC consists of the following functions:
1) fconceal. It takes as input the original set, SetAO, and outputs a concealed set, SetAC. That is,
fconceal : SetAO ) SetAC;
where SetA) SetB means that 8x 2 SetA, compute y = fconceal(x) and include y in SetB.
Table 1. Notation.
Adv Adversary
Advsra Set Reveal Attack
Advsla Set Linkage Attack
fconceal Concealing Function
fintersect Intersection Set Computation Function
freveal Reveal Function
SetAC Concealed Set from A
SetAO Original Set from A
SetBC Concealed Set from B
SetBO Original Set from B
SetIC “Intersection set” for Concealed Set
SetIAO Indeed Intersection Set in Original Set from A
SetIBO Indeed Intersection Set in Original Set from B
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157752.t001
LiPISC: A Lightweight and Flexible PISC
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0157752 June 21, 2016 5 / 12
2) fintersect. It takes as input two sets, SetAC and SetBC, and outputs a concealed intersection
set, SetIC. That is,
fintersect : SetAC  SetBC ) SetIC:
3) freveal. It takes as input a set, SetIC, and outputs an original intersection set, SetIO. That is,
freveal : SetIC ) SetIAO; SetIC ) SetIBO;
where SetIO = SetAO ^ SetBO, SetIAO = SetIO ^ SetAO, SetIBO = SetIO ^ SetBO. Certainly, SetIO =
SetIAO = SetIBO.
Therefore, in LiPISC,
1. A and B conceal the original sets SetA and SetB using fconceal, and obtain concealed sets SetAC
and SetBC, respectively.
2. A and B respectively send concealed sets SetAC and SetBC to C.
3. C computes the intersection set SetIC from the received concealed sets using fintersect. C then
returns SetIC to both A and B.
4. A finds the indeed intersection set (SetIAO) of the original sets (i.e., SetAO ^ SetBO) from SetIC
using freveal. Similarly, B finds the indeed intersection set (SetIBO) of the original sets (i.e.,
SetAO ^ SetBO) from SetIC using freveal.
Thus, LiPISC can be formulated as an abstract model:
1) Entity A:
1.1) fconceal : SetAO) SetAC;
1.2) A! C : SetAC.
2) Entity B:
2.1) fconceal : SetBO) SetBC;
2.2) B! C : SetBC.
3) Server C:
3.1) fintersect : SetAC × SetBC) SetIC;
3.2) C! A : SetIC;
3.3) C! B : SetIC.
4)
Entity A:
4.1) freveal : SetIC) SetIAO;
Entity B:
4.2) freveal : SetIC) SetIBO.
The requirement is as follows: fconceal.
Proposition 4.1 fconceal should achieve the functionality to defend against Advsra and Advsla.
Proof fconceal is the only transformation of the original set before the observation of the
adversary. After this transformation, the adversary at C can observe the transformation result
of fconceal. Thus, fconceal should defend against Advsra and Advsla. □
fconceal should make it possible to find the corresponding fintersect and freveal. That is, corre-
sponding fintersect and freveal should be found easily and should perform efficiently after the
transformation of fconceal. Thus, fconceal is the most important of three functions. Besides, these
three functions must be lightweight in terms of computation. Therefore, finding proper fconceal
has the highest priority in searches.
LiPISC: A Lightweight and Flexible PISC
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4.2 Basic Construction
The basic construction is described as follows:
1) Entity A:
1.1) fconceal : SetAO) SetAC. Let fconceal ¼ HashðÞ : f0; 1gm ! f0; 1gn;m; n 2 N; That is,
SetAC( Hash(x 2 SetAO), where Hash() could be a cryptographic hash function. In other
words, SetAC = {y|y =Hash(x), 8x 2 SetAO}.
1.2) A! C : ID[i], SetAC[i], where i = 1, . . ., |SetAC|; || returns the number of items in the
set ; ID[i] is a temporary sequence number for i-th item in SetAC, which is denoted as SetAC[i];
2) Entity B:
2.1) B : fconceal : SetBO) SetBC; Similar to 1.1), let fconceal =Hash(); SetBC(Hash(SetBO),
whereHash() could be a one-way cryptographic hash function. In other words, SetBC =Hash
(x 2 SetBO) = {y|y =Hash(x), 8x 2 SetBO}.
2.2) B! C : ID[i], SetBC[i], where i = 1, . . ., |SetBC|; ID[i] is a temporary sequence number
for i-th item in SetBC, which is denoted as SetBC[i];
3) Server C:
3.1) fintersect : SetAC ^ SetBC) SetIC;
3.2) C! A : ID[i], where SetAC[i] 2 SetIC, i 2 [1, |SetAC|]; The total number of i is |SetIC|;
That is, |ID[i]| = |SetIC|;
3.3) C! B : ID[j], where SetBC[j] 2 SetIC, j 2 [1, |SetBC|]; The total number of j is |SetIC|;
That is, |ID[j]| = |SetIC|;
4)
Entity A:
4.1) freveal : ID[i])SetIAO; As A has computed SetAC(Hash(SetAO) before, A can retrieve
corresponding i-th item in SetAO that will compose final SetIAO;
Entity B:
4.2) freveal : ID[j])SetIBO; As B has computed SetBC(Hash(SetBO) before, A can retrieve
corresponding j-th item in SetBO that will compose final SetIBO;
Remarks
1) fconceal is pre-deployed or negotiated in advance at A and B, or distributed by C instantly
and publicly. Even though fconceal is publicly known, Advsra is still defended against due to the
cryptographic properties of Hash().
2) Note that Hash() could be any function with dedicated requirements, although a compu-
tationally efficient cryptographic hash is usually preferred. Next, we will define the one-way
and collision resistant requirements.
Proposition 4.2 fconceal : f0; 1gm ! f0; 1gn;m  n 2 N should be one-way.
Proof Due to 4.1, fconceal should have functionality of defending against Advsra. H(x|fcon-
ceal(x)) =H(x) for PPTM adversary. Pr{x|y = fconceal(x)} = 1/2
n1/2m−n = 1/2m = negl(m) should
be negligible whenm is sufficient large. negl(m) is a negligible function inm. Given y compute
x is hard; thus, fconceal must be one-way. □
Proposition 4.3 fconceal should be collision resistant.
Proof fconceal should be collision resistant, which is not for security but for the soundness of
resulting intersection set returned from C. If so, the probability will be negligible that y1 2
SetAC and y2 2 SetBC are equal but x1 2 SetAO and x2 2 SetBO are not equal. □
Note that it is non-trivial to be aware that fconceal is not second pre-image resistant, because
server C has no idea of the pre-image of SetAC as well as SetBC.
Proposition 4.4 The false probability of basic construction for PISC is 1/2m−n. That is, Pr{x1
2 SetAO 6¼ x2 2 SetBO|y = fconceal(x1) 2 SetAC, y = fconceal(x2) 2 SetBC} = 1/2m−n.
LiPISC: A Lightweight and Flexible PISC
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0157752 June 21, 2016 7 / 12
Proof There are 1/2m−n x 2 SetAO mapping into the same y 2 SetAC. Thus, even y is the
same x is different. The false probability of basic construction is 1/2m−n. □
3) Only last k, k< |Hash()| = n bits can be selected in Hash() during comparison to further
improve the efficiency, but it may induce extra false members in intersection set with false
probability (namely, 1/2m−k).
The privacy strength for the basic construction is as follows:
Proposition 4.5 Basic construction can defend against Advsra but not Advsla.
Proof As fconceal is one-way, the adversary can reveal neither SetAO from SetAC nor SetBO
from SetBC. Thus, Advsra is defended against. However, the same y 2 SetAC(SetBC) in different
rounds can be linked to the same x 2 SetAO(SetBO). Thus, Advsla is not defended against. □
4.3 An Enhanced Basic Construction
To defend against Advsla, we propose the following enhancement by adding a random number
to be used only once (i.e., nonce) in fconceal to make it unlinkable when the adversary observes
SetAC (or SetBC). More specifically, the enhancement is at steps 1.1) and 2.1) with the addition
of the nonce, respectively. The enhanced steps 1.1) and 2.1) are as follows:
1.1) fconceal : SetAO) SetAC. Let fconceal =Hash(); That is, SetAC(H(nonceA||SetAO), where
Hash() could be a cryptographic hash function; nonce is a number used once. In other words,
8x 2 SetAO, y( Hash(nonceA||x), y 2 SetAC.
2.1) fconceal : SetBO) SetBC; Similar to 1.1), let fconceal =Hash(); SetBC(Hash(nonceB||
SetBO), whereH() is a cryptographic hash function with one-wayness. In other words, 8x 2
SetBO, y(Hash(nonceB||x), y 2 SetBC.
Remarks
1) NonceA and NonceB could be timestamps, in which A and B need to be synchronized in
advance.
2) NonceA and NonceB could be a value from a pseudorandom number generator, which is
generated from a shared secret key (seed) and synchronized at A and B. That is, Nonce = PRNG
(k), where k is a shared secret key between A and B (e.g., generated using a key establishment
protocol [25]); PRNG() is a pseudorandom number generator.
3) NonceA and NonceB could be a synchronized counter.
Proposition 4.6 The enhanced basic construction can defend against Advsra and Advsla.
Proof The enhanced basic construction can defend against Advsra inherently due to basic
construction. The discussion, thus, only concentrates on Advsla. As NonceA and NonceB vary in
each round, the same y 2 SetAC(SetBC) in different rounds usually cannot be identified by the
adversary due to the collision resistance property of fconceal. Thus, the linkage will not be drawn
and Advsla is defended against. □
4.4 Advanced Construction with Rough Intersection for Flexibility
In a real-world deployment, such as on-line social networks and e-commerce websites, entity
A and entity B are unlikely to have the exact number or same members in the submitted sets.
Although exact intersection of SetAO and SetBO dose not exist, server C is still required to return
approximate intersection of SetAO and SetBO. In this scenario, server C has to recommend the
most approximate intersection of SetAO and SetBO from SetAC and SetBC. The basic construction
and the enhanced basic construction are not able to address such a situation. Thus, we propose
an advanced method that can satisfy this requirement.
Intuitively, if Hash() is “fuzzy” in that kx1 − x2k 2 Δ)ky1 − y2k 2 Δ, y1 =Hash(x1), y2 =
Hash(x2), the rough set will be returned. Here, kk returns either the absolute value or the ham-
ming distance. However, this fuzzy property may compromise the one-wayness.
LiPISC: A Lightweight and Flexible PISC
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The improvements are due to the following: at fconceal,Hash() is replaced by
GðÞ : gx mod p, where p is a sufﬁcient large prime, and at fintersect, the comparison is changed
into computation of ðgx1Þ=ðgx2Þ  gd. More speciﬁcally, the method is described as follows:
1) Entity A:
1.1) A : fconceal : SetAO) SetAC. Let fconceal ¼ gx mod p, where x 2 SetAO; p is a large prime.
That is, SetAC( G(SetAO), where G(Set) means to compute fconceal(x) for 8x 2 Set. In other
words, SetAC ¼ fyj8x 2 SetAO; y ¼ gx mod pg.
1.2) A! C : ID[i], SetAC[i], where i = 1, . . ., |SetAC|; || returns the number of items in the
set ; ID[i] is a temporary sequence number for i-th item in SetAC, which is denoted as SetAC[i];
2) Entity B:
2.1) B : fconceal : SetBO) SetBC; Similar to 1.1), let fconceal ¼ gx mod p, where x 2 SetBO; That
is, SetBC( G(SetBO). In other words, SetBC ¼ fyj8x 2 SetBO; y ¼ gx mod pg.
2.2) B! C : ID[i], SetBC[i], where i = 1, . . ., |SetBC|; ID[i] is a temporary sequence number
for i-th item in SetBC, which is denoted as SetBC[i];
3) Server C:
3.1) fintersect : 8SetAC[i] 2 SetAC, SetBC[j] 2 SetBC, if SetAC[i]/SetBC[j]< gδ< p, let SetAC[i]_
SetBC[j])SetIC;
3.2) C! A : ID[i], where SetAC[i] 2 SetIC, i 2 [1, |SetAC|]; The total number of i is |SetIC|/2;
That is, |ID[i]| = |SetIC|/2;
3.3) C! B : ID[j], where SetBC[j] 2 SetIC, j 2 [1, |SetBC|]; The total number of j is |SetIC|/2;
That is, |ID[j]| = |SetIC|/2;
4)
Entity A:
4.1) freveal : ID[i])SetIAO; As A computes SetAC( G(SetAO), A can reveal corresponding i-
th item in SetAO that consists final SetIAO;
Entity B:
4.2) freveal : ID[j])SetIBO; As B computes SetBC( G(SetBO), A can reveal corresponding j-th
item in SetBO that consists final SetIBO;
Remarks
1) To reduce the computation overhead at entity A and entity B, in computing G(), A and
B can only compute the last k bits of x, y, 8x 2 SetAO and 8y 2 SetBO. log2 x = {0,1}m = {0,1}m −
kk{0,1}k, log2 y = {0,1}n = {0,1}n − kk{0,1}k. It will not compromise the soundness of PISC if k is
properly chosen. We state the chosen method in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7 If the absolute gap value between x 2 SetAO and y 2 SetBO is kx − yk, we let k
= log2 loggkx − yk.
Proof x 2 SetAO, gx mod p 2 SetAC. x 2 SetBO, gx mod p 2 SetBC. gxgy can be computed via
gmþðxmÞ
gmþðymÞ ; where logg(x −m)< 2
k and logg(y −m)< 2
k. Thus, only computing the last k bits of x,
y will not result in any difference for g
x
gy
at server C. □
2) δ is a system parameter, which measures the approximate strength of the intersection set.
More specifically, we state it formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8 If the absolute gap value between x 2 SetAO and y 2 SetBO is kx − yk, the
intersection set produced by PISC will have kx − yk  δ.
Proof x 2 SetAO, gx mod p 2 SetAC . y 2 SetBO, gy mod p 2 SetBC . Server C selects intersec-
tion set by g
x
gy
< gd; thus kx − yk  δ + kφ(p) = δ + k(p − 1), where ϕ() is Euler function, and
k 2 N . p − 1>> δ and x p − 1, y p − 1, thus kx − yk  δ. □
From above two propositions, we can choose k = log2 loggkx − yk = log2 logg δ bits at rear of
log2 x, 8x 2 SetAO or log2 y, 8y 2 SetBO to compute SetAC and SetBC, respectively.
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3) The computation overhead at server C is module exponential computation (for comput-
ing gd mod p) and one time division (for computing SetAC[i]/SetBC[j]). The computation over-
head at an entity is module exponential computation (for computing gk mod p and k is at
most log2 logg δ bits).
Proposition 4.9 The advanced construction can defend against Advsra, but not Advsla.
Proof As fconceal is one-way due to the underlying discrete logarithm problem, Advsra is
defended against. As fconceal is a deterministic function, the same image will link to the same
pre-image; thus, Advsla cannot be defended against. □
Proposition 4.10 In the advanced construction, fconceal is collision resistant.
Proof The aim is to prove that it is difficult to find x 6¼ y such at gx	 gy mod p. That is, it is
difficult to find x 6¼ y such that gx−y mod p = 1. If gx−y mod p = 1, x − ymod p − 1 = 0 by Fer-
mat’s theorem. As x − y< δ and p is a big prime, it is computational infeasible for
x  y mod p 1 ¼ 0. □
Proposition 4.11 The advanced construction is sound.
Proof It is concluded from the previous propositions. fconceal is one-way, collision resistant,
and the returned intersection sets are indeed the approximate members. Thus, the advanced
construction is sound. □
Finally, to defend against Advsla, we propose an enhancement method for the advanced con-
struction by adding a nonce in fconceal. More specifically, the enhancement is at Steps 1.1) and
Step 2.1) by multiplying the nonce, respectively:
1.1). fconceal = nonce  gx mod p, where x 2 SetAO; p is a large prime. That is, SetAC( G
(SetAO), where G(Set) means to compute fconceal(x) for 8x 2 Set. In other words,
SetAC ¼ fyj8x 2 SetAO; y ¼ nonce  gx mod pg:
2.1) fconceal = nonce  gx mod p, where x 2 SetBO; That is, SetBC( G(SetBO).
The discussion on nonce is similar to the aforementioned remarks in the last section.
The security proof after the inclusion of nonce is similar to Proposition 4.6. Until now, we
reach the final proposed version of PISC that is the enhancement of the advanced construc-
tion. This incremental presentation helps for better understanding and smoothly
remembering.
Potential Applications and Further Discussions
1) Example I. In social networks for recommending prospective friends, both users B and C
are user A’s friends; thus, the intersection set of B’s friends and C’s friends may also be A’s
friends. The service provider needs to perform PISC of two inputs—B’s friends and C’s friends,
and those inputs should be concealed for privacy protection.
2) Example II. For recommending potentially goods of interest in an e-commence website,
B’s purchase history and C’s purchase history have overlapping items with A’s purchase history
(i.e., A, B, C have similar purchasing habits and preferences); thus, the intersection set of user
B’s purchases and C’s purchases may also interest A. The service provider needs to perform
PISC of two concealed inputs—B’s purchase history and C’s purchase history. Since we require
that the purchase history of both B and C to be unlinkable, the service provider is unable to
guess whether the same item exists in B’s or C’s purchase history.
3) As in LiPISC, A and B have to establish a shared nonce, which may require synchroniza-
tion at both A and B. Alternatively, nonce can also be distributed by servers which does not
break the security of the scheme as the servers will not know the nonce due to the one-wayness
of fconceal.
4) As stated in Section 3 (i.e., Problem Formulation), the adversary (trust) model in this
paper only assumes an adversary at a central server. That is, entity A and entity B for PISC is
trustworthy. Nonetheless, even though A (or B) could be un-trustworthy, A (or B) can only
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reveal the intersection set with B (or A) by random guess due to the one-wayness of fconceal. The
probability of successful guess is negligible due to the selection of fconceal.
5) The gap between numeric distance represents the numeric deviation of inputting values,
and the gap between Hamming distance represents the property deviation. The former gap can
be computed from the latter gap if the major difference comes from the bits at the end, and the
latter gap can also be estimated from the former gap. In this paper, we focus on the numeric
distance, which is more general than the Hamming gap. In addition, the proposed method is
suitable for both two situations, as here only rough intersection set computation is required.
6) The proposed scheme outperforms related work in sever aspects as follows: It is light-
weight as only raw discrete logarithm computation is involved instead of cryptographic
encryption. It can compute rough intersection set that is flexible in realistic. It tackles set link-
age attack that has not been carefully explored in the literatures.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced two new attacks against PISC, which we coined as set reveal attack
and set linkage attack. We then proposed a lightweight and flexible PISC (LiPISC), which
achieves approximate intersection set computation and rough intersection set computation in
a lightweight manner. We then proved the security of LiPISC.
Future work includes deploying the proposed scheme in a real-world application, such as e-
commerce website, with the aims of refining and validating the scheme.
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